JP Moreland's Modal Argument for Substance Dualism

This is an argument presented by JP Moreland here (he credits Alexander Pruss):

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/371750736_The_Modal_Argument_and_a_Rejoinder_to_Contingent_Physicalism


From the paper, the argument is:

(1) The Indiscernibility of Identicals & (x=y)→•(x=y).

(2) POs are essentially, wholly, and intrinsically physical and SSs are essentially, wholly, and intrinsically immaterial. 

(3) Possibly, I exist, and no POs exist. 

(4) My physical body is a PO.

(5) Therefore, possibly, I exist without my physical body existing.

(6) Therefore, it is not the case that I am essentially, wholly, and intrinsically my body or any PO.

(7) I am essentially, wholly, and intrinsically either a PO or SS.

(8) Therefore, I am essentially, wholly, and intrinsically a SS.

PO stands for "physical object" while "SS stands for spiritual substance".


Elsewhere he gives a more simplistic summary:

I am possibly disembodied (I could survive without my brain or body).​

My brain or body are not possibly disembodied (they could not survive without being physical).​

Therefore, I am not my brain or body, I am a soul.


Going through the formal argument step by step...

(1) The first step is invoking the law of "Indiscernibility of Identicals", which is discussed fully here, but in essence says that if two things are identical, they have the same properties and so cannot be discerned. It is pretty obvious, but philosopher like to build on trivial truths like this.

(2) Physical objects are physical, spiritual substances are not. Again, trivial.

(3) This is saying it is possible the physical world does not exist; that there are no physical objects - including my body - and yet I know that I do (I think therefore I am).

(4) Obviously my physical body is a physical object.

(5) Given (3) and (4) it is at least possible I exist or could exist without a body.

(6) Given (5), it must be the case that I am not the same as my physical body.

(7) I (the essence that is me) must be either physical or not.

(8) Given (6) and (7), I (the essence that is me) must not be physical.


Where this argument fails, in my view, is between steps (5) and (6). If (5) is possibly true, then he is tacitly admitting it is possibly not true (otherwise he is assuming what he is concluding - a circular argument).

5a. It is possible I could not exist without my body,

6a. Therefore it is possible that what I am is essentially my body

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